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The science of consciousness is a nascent and thriving field of research that is founded
on identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness. However, I have
argued that it is the neural constitution of consciousness that science seeks to understand
and that there are no evident strategies for distinguishing the correlates and constitution
of (phenomenal) consciousness. Here I review this correlation/constitution distinction
problem and challenge the existing foundations of consciousness science. I present
the main analyses from a longer paper in press on this issue, focusing on recording,
inhibition, stimulation, and combined inhibition/stimulation strategies, including proposal
of the Jenga analogy to illustrate why identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates
of consciousness should not be considered the ultimate target of consciousness science.
Thereafter I suggest that while combined inhibition and stimulation strategies might
identify some constitutive neural activities—indeed minimally sufficient constitutive neural
activities—such strategies fail to identify the whole neural constitution of consciousness
and thus the correlation/constitution distinction problem is not fully solved. Various
clarifications, potential objections and related scientific and philosophical issues are also
discussed and I conclude by proposing new foundational claims for consciousness science.
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM
The science of consciousness is founded on searching for the
neural correlates of consciousness (Crick and Koch, 1990, 1998;
Crick, 1994; usually referred to as “NCC” but here as “NCrC,”
unless quoting directly). Specifically, consciousness science seeks
to identify the minimally sufficient NCrC. Chalmers (2000) pro-
vided a foundational work concerning this notion, in a paper
entitled, “What is a neural correlate of consciousness?” His paper
is widely cited, as is his definition of the NCrC (p. 31):
An NCC is a minimal neural system N such that there is a mapping
from states of N to states of consciousness, where a given state of
N is sufficient, under conditions C, for the corresponding state of
consciousness.
Also widely cited is the shorter definition by Koch (2004, p.
16) in which the NCrC is considered to be the “minimal set of
neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific
conscious percept.” Although there has been some discussion
of Chalmers’ definitions and claims, and the methodological
assumptions on which they are based (e.g., Noë and Thompson,
2004; Bayne, 2007; Hohwy, 2007, 2009; Neisser, 2012; Bayne and
Hohwy, 2013), there has been less scrutiny than might be expected
for a foundational work in a nascent scientific discipline.
A few years ago, two groups of scientists (Aru et al.,
2012; de Graaf et al., 2012) independently parsed NCrCs into
“NCrC substrate” or “NCrC proper” on the one hand (the
construct of interest for consciousness science) and “NCrC
precursors/prerequisites” and “NCrC consequences” on the other
(constructs of lesser interest). Their partition was aimed at devel-
oping strategies to distinguish these various NCrCs and this
is of course, the topic of this special issue. In proposing this
terminology, however, these authors were unaware that the prob-
lem of identifying which, from among many, NCrCs1 are most
directly relevant to consciousness had been appreciated, named
and analyzed a decade prior.
Both Revonsuo (2000, 2001, 2006, in press) and myself (Miller,
2001, 2007, 2013a, in press-a,b) have been explicitly concerned
with just how science will distinguish the neural correlates and
the neural constitution of consciousness (NCnC). This is partic-
ularly problematic for phenomenal consciousness—the subjec-
tive or qualitative nature of our conscious states (Nagel, 1974).
Revonsuo’s (2000, 2001) concern was that current scientific
methodologies—brain recording techniques in particular—are
not capable of targeting the right level of organization in the brain
(which he termed, “the phenomenal level”). Revonsuo (2006,
in press) also developed a highly detailed level-based biological
framework for a consciousness research program that seeks to
discover the constitutive mechanisms of consciousness.
1Note that the plural “NCrCs” indicates the many individual neural activities
that correlate with a specific state of consciousness. This is different to “the
NCrC” which is a collective term commonly used to denote the set of all
NCrCs for such a state. More points of clarification and definition are detailed
below.
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Although I have a great deal of affinity with Revonsuo’s con-
cerns and his framework, my development of the issue has been
different. I noted (Miller, 2001) that although the problem of
identifying the constitution of consciousness had been alluded to
by investigators in the science of consciousness, such as Francis
Crick, Christof Koch, and Nikos Logothetis (Crick, 1994; Crick
and Koch, 1998; Logothetis, 1998)2, it required much more than
such passing reference. I therefore sought to name and examine
the correlation/constitution distinction problem (herewith, Cr/Cn
distinction problem) so that it might be addressed explicitly, with
a view to its solution or dissolution, or indeed to its acceptance as
an ultimate epistemic limit.
I explicated the Cr/Cn distinction problem utilizing the phe-
nomenon of binocular rivalry (Miller, 2001). Unlike Revonsuo,
my initial analysis led me to be concerned that perhaps even future
scientific methodologies, including those targeting the right level
of organization in the brain, might fail to solve the problem. I
suggested there were no obvious corollaries regarding the NCnC
from studies of the NCrC and yet it was the NCnC that a science
of consciousness should ultimately wish to identify. I therefore
proposed that consciousness science might require entirely new
scientific strategies if it is to move from mere correlation to actual
constitution. My initial concerns were re-stated and developed in
a subsequent paper (Miller, 2007), in which I noted (p. 161, italics
in original):
If we imagine that through the employment of all current and
future neuroscientific methods (in all contexts, under all condi-
tions and with all methodological constraints overcome), we were
able to obtain a complete, real-time and multimodal description
of all the NCC and all observable properties of such, would we be
satisfied that we had obtained a comprehensive understanding of
the neuroscience of consciousness? I assert not, because not every
neural correlate of a conscious state is necessarily constitutive of that
state.
In both my 2001 and 2007 papers, I discussed how
NCrC recording, inhibition (disablement), and stimulation
techniques—either alone or in combination—failed to distin-
guish correlated but non-constitutive neural activities that are
upstream or downstream from correlated constitutive neural activ-
ities (Miller, 2001, 2007). (This upstream/downstream terminol-
ogy is equivalent to the precursors/consequences terminology and
is also used by others; e.g., Chalmers, 2000; Hohwy and Bayne, in
press.)3 I considered therefore, that these empirical approaches
failed to yield conclusions regarding the NCnC, that entirely
new approaches might be needed and that the Cr/Cn distinction
problem might need to join other well-known hard problems
of consciousness. I also made it clear, however, that there were
no grounds, as yet, to proclaim the problem intractable (Miller,
2007).
2I expect the problem to have been alluded to by many other authors as well, as
I continue to discover (e.g., Bachmann, 2000, p. 125; Frith et al., 1999, p. 109).
3It should also be noted that in addition to correlated non-constitutive
activities upstream and downstream from correlated constitutive activities,
there can be correlated non-constitutive activities that are parallel to correlated
constitutive activities. For simplicity, in the arguments that follow I do not
consider the parallel category further.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM
Discussion of the Cr/Cn distinction problem has since gained
momentum, evidenced by this special issue and by a two-volume
project in which scientists and philosophers discuss the problem
and the conceptual, empirical, and philosophical territory within
which it is situated. In the first volume (Miller, 2013a), scientific
groundwork was laid with papers on the brain and visual system’s
constituents, organization and processes, on the current status of
binocular rivalry research from multiple empirical perspectives
and on current neuroscientific investigative techniques (includ-
ing various invasive and non-invasive recording, inhibition, and
stimulation techniques).
The second volume (Miller, in press-a) addresses scientific and
philosophic perspectives on consciousness science and its meth-
ods and foundational constructs, the Cr/Cn distinction problem,
the philosophical territory of phenomenal consciousness, hard
problems of consciousness, the notion of explanation in con-
sciousness science, the relation between brain and mind, and in
particular, notions of correlation, constitution, identity, causa-
tion, supervenience, emergence, and realization. My paper in that
second volume (Miller, in press-b) closely examines Chalmers’
(2000) foundational notion of the minimally sufficient NCrC
and through that analysis suggests new foundational claims for
consciousness science.
In the present paper—given the topic of this special issue—
I outline the specifically methodological aspects from Miller (in
press-b). I start by providing brief reference to foundational
issues in consciousness science and then discuss neural inhibition
approaches that challenge those issues. Thereafter I discuss neural
stimulation and the combined inhibition/stimulation approach,
suggesting that although the latter may provide the best evidence
for identifying at least some constitutive neural activities, it fails
to fully solve the Cr/Cn distinction problem. Various points of
clarification are then discussed and six objections to the presented
arguments are listed, with three discussed in detail. A brief presen-
tation of related scientific and philosophic issues is then provided
and I conclude with the proposed new foundational claims for
consciousness science.
A BRIEF SCAN OF THE FOUNDATIONS
The Cr/Cn distinction problem is neatly exposed when consider-
ing NCrCs during binocular rivalry. This visual phenomenon—
in which dynamic perceptual alternations are induced by static
presentation of a different image to each eye—provides several
advantages for the scientific study of consciousness (reviewed in
Miller, 2013b). In particular, binocular rivalry allows for dissocia-
tion between neural activity correlated with a subject’s perceptual
alternations and neural activity correlated with image presenta-
tion. Thus, perception-dependent neural activity is rightly con-
sidered a neural correlate of visual consciousness during rivalry.
However, the perception-dependent data for rivalry from elec-
trophysiological and brain-imaging recording studies (reviewed
in many chapters in Miller, 2013a) yield a wide array of such
NCrCs. This makes evident the Cr/Cn distinction problem. That
is, because not every NCrC is necessarily constitutive of that con-
scious state, we can ask which NCrCs from this array are actually
constitutive. Moreover, we can ask what methodologies science
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might employ to experimentally examine various hypotheses in
this regard.
In Chalmers’ (2000) examination of the NCrC notion, he
discusses the range of cases over which a correlation should be
expected to hold. Those discussed include the normal brain,
unusual input (such as binocular rivalry), lesion studies, and
stimulation studies. Chalmers’ analysis is predominantly concep-
tual rather than a detailed methodological approach to identi-
fying the NCrC, but he does discuss the lesion case in some
depth. He notes that such studies should be regarded very cau-
tiously and perhaps abandoned altogether in searching for the
NCrC, due to the altered brain architecture they induce (thus
suggesting that an NCrC should be architecture-dependent not
architecture-independent)4. Chalmers discusses in far less detail,
the methodological NCrC approach to the normal brain, unusual
input, and brain stimulation. He notes nonetheless that there are
interpretive complexities with unusual input and brain stimu-
lation too, but he considers these cases and the normal brain
case to be those over which an NCrC should be required to
hold (with perhaps some “good” lesion approaches also being
admitted). The present analyses aim to address in detail, inhibi-
tion and stimulation empirical strategies—and their interpretive
complexities—that surround the notion of the minimally suffi-
cient NCrC.
There are several other aspects to Chalmers’ (2000) formu-
lation of the NCrC construct that are worth mentioning. First,
his definition is intended to constrain the discussion to “correla-
tion” terminology, as he considers this to be theoretically neutral
rather than theoretically loaded. Second, he notes his definition
is constructed in a way that provides a tractable methodology for
NCrC identification, and thus a way forward for consciousness
science. Third, he accepts that even if the thus-defined NCrC was
identified, this would not necessarily explain consciousness and
may not even be the key to understanding processes underly-
ing consciousness. However, he does not explicitly consider the
potential for a Cr/Cn distinction problem, perhaps because of his
reluctance to shift the discussion beyond notions of correlation.
Moreover, although his formulation of the minimally sufficient
NCrC construct acknowledges the empirical potential it provides,
it does not adequately examine the empirical entailment of the
“minimally sufficient” qualifier or the methodological details of
such entailment.
As outlined in greater detail in Miller (in press-b), despite the
valuable contribution provided by Chalmers’ conceptual propos-
als, there are several problems with accepting his formulation
as unchallenged foundations for consciousness science. Indeed,
Chalmers himself considered his work to be “conceptual spade-
work” that would require refinement. If my contention above is
4Although Chalmers expresses caution over the lesion analysis case, no one
would deny that modern understanding of the brain and its functional
specialization owes a great debt to such neuropsychological analysis. Phe-
nomenological dysfunction following destruction of certain brain regions by
cerebrovascular insult, brain tumors, traumatic brain injury or surgery has
informed mechanistic understanding of normal brain function enormously
(Damasio and Damasio, 1989; Howieson et al., 2012), as has direct electrical
stimulation of the brain (Borchers et al., 2012; see Stepwise Stimulation and
Combined Inhibition/Stimulation).
accurate—that consciousness science wishes to ultimately identify
the NCnC—then it is noteworthy that this construct is nowhere
to be seen in Chalmers’ analysis. It is a construct that can be
conveyed using a wide range of terms such as the neural “basis,”
“mechanism,” or “substrate” of consciousness (see Miller, 2007
for more terms), so concerns over the entailed philosophical
commitments of “constitution” terminology should not be reason
to avoid such a construct, or something like it5. Moreover, once
we admit talk of such notions, questions arise regarding: (i)
whether by minimally sufficient NCrC, we mean the very same
thing as the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution
of consciousness; (ii) whether these constructs pick out the same
or different neural activity sets; and (iii) if they could pick out
different neural activity sets, which should be considered the
ultimate empirical target for consciousness science.
STEPWISE INHIBITION
The notion of the minimally sufficient NCrC was created to
distinguish it from the merely sufficient NCrC (with a necessity
criterion being considered altogether too strong; Chalmers, 2000).
However, the distinction between the merely and minimally suf-
ficient NCrC entails an empirical strategy. If we are to arrive at
identification of the minimally sufficient NCrC, we will presum-
ably need to remove NCrCs one by one to assess whether each
has minimally sufficient status. It is critical here to note that
when I refer to an NCrC being minimally sufficient, or having
minimally sufficient status, I mean to say that it is a part of the
whole minimally sufficient neural activity set. Similarly, when I
refer to an NCrC being constitutive, or having constitutive status,
I mean to say that it is a part of the whole NCnC. Returning to the
empirical approach to reducing the merely sufficient NCrC to the
minimally sufficient NCrC, the most obvious means of doing this
is by stepwise inhibition (disablement) of neurons, neuron types6,
5There are differences between the terms “basis,” “mechanism”, “substrate,”
and “constitution,” however, in most of what follows, I use these terms
synonymously. Hence, by “NCnC” I mean to equally imply the neural “basis,”
“mechanism,” or “substrate” of consciousness. At times I will state these
terms in full to remind the reader of this point and indeed, on this broad
construal, one could even “define” the NCnC as the neural basis, mecha-
nism, or substrate of consciousness. However, although the Cr/Cn distinction
problem is able to be appreciated and analyzed using any of these broadly
synonymous terms, use of “constitution” terminology becomes relevant and
informative later, as a specific relation within philosophy of mind (with
additional implications for science thereafter). It is because of the relational
complexities in the philosophical domain that I resist any further simple
definition of the NCnC. For example, a definition could be proposed that
states the NCnC is the neural activity that simply is the conscious state in
question, but any such definition then invites debate about contrasting the “is
of identity” with the “is of constitution” (see Miller, 2007, and various papers
in Miller, in press-a).
6On the issue of neuron types, Koch (2004, p. 282) refers to perception-
dependent neural activity high in the visual processing pathway (inferior
temporal cortex, IT, and superior temporal sulcus, STS) during binocular
rivalry as follows:
It is implausible that all of the storied IT and STS neurons that follow
the percept express its phenomenological attributes directly. Some must be
involved in the underlying winner-take-all operations; others must relay the
winner’s identity to the motor centers to initiate behavior or to short-term
memory for future recall; some must carry a transient signal indicative of
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local or distributed neural circuits, specific brain regions or sets of
NCrCs.
Chalmers’ definitions would seem to imply something like a
stepwise inhibition empirical strategy when he comments (2000,
p. 25), “In this way, we pare down any potential NCC to its core:
Any irrelevant material will be whittled away, and an NCC will
be required to contain only the core processes that suffice for the
conscious state in question.” There is some conflict in Chalmers’
view here, given his willingness to whittle away but not to lesion.
We therefore need to qualify the type of inhibition to be employed
in identifying the minimally sufficient NCrC, and select methods
that do not induce gross lesions and consequent architectural
disruption (such as that induced by stroke, tumor, injury, or
surgery). Although current methods such as inhibitory transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation could be employed—and indeed this
method provides striking and immediate perceptual disruption
during binocular rivalry (Miller et al., 2000; see also Ngo et al.,
2013)—for conceptual clarity we might postulate future highly
specific molecular knockout techniques in which this or that
NCrC can be selectively and reversibly inhibited. Such techniques
were predicted by Crick and Koch (1998; see also the quote
further below from Fenno et al., 2011) and are currently being
developed and refined, with stunning progress, in the field of
optogenetics (as detailed further below; Fenno et al., 2011; see
also Klink et al., 2013). Although harmless application of such
techniques in humans remains a very long way off, we can
nonetheless begin to think through how such highly selective
inhibitory techniques could, in principle, assist with identification
of the NCnC.
As I have previously noted (Miller, 2001, 2007), if we inhibit
an NCrC and consciousness disappears (or degrades), this might
suggest the inhibited NCrC is constitutive in the normal case but
does not actually prove its constitutive status. This is because such
an NCrC might simply be necessary and supportive for conscious-
ness without being constitutive of it. Conversely, if we inhibit
an NCrC and consciousness does not disappear (or degrade),
this might suggest the inhibited NCrC is non-constitutive in the
normal case but does not prove such non-constitutive status.
This is because such an NCrC might simply be redundantly
constitutive. Because of these uncertainties, I have claimed that
stepwise inhibition does not lead to conclusions regarding the
NCnC. However, it certainly does lead to conclusions regarding
the minimally sufficient NCrC.
THE JENGA ANALOGY
To illustrate how the minimally sufficient NCrC and the NCnC
are constructs that can pick out different neural activity sets,
a perceptual switch; and still others might represent the same information
but in a delayed manner.
When considering the temporal profile of cellular responses in these areas,
I am struck by their extreme heterogeneity. An entire menagerie of distinct
patterns can be observed. Some cells fire in a transient manner whereas
others respond in a more sustained fashion. Some fire in bursts, some show
a pronounced, rhythmic discharge in the 4–6 Hz range, while others peak
early before settling down to a more sedate and sustained pace of firing.
Do these reflect discrete cell types with discrete functions and connectivity
patterns? This will be important to know.
and to schematize the stepwise inhibition approach described
above, I have proposed the Jenga analogy (Miller, in press-b).
This analogy is from the popular game in which blocks are
removed from a tower structure, one by one, until eventually a
critical point is reached and the tower falls. An upright tower
in this analogy (Figure 1) represents a specific conscious state
or content being present while the fallen tower represents the
absence (or degradation) of that conscious state or content. Each
block in the tower represents an NCrC that correlates with that
specific conscious state or content. This follows the distinction
by Koch (2004) between “specific factors” and “enabling fac-
tors,” with the former dealing with particular conscious states
or content and the latter with the overall state of being con-
scious. Although this distinction is itself the subject of consid-
erable conceptual and methodological controversy (see Noë and
Thompson, 2004; Bayne, 2007; Hohwy, 2007, 2009; Neisser, 2012;
Bayne and Hohwy, 2013; Hohwy and Bayne, in press), I sidestep
this debate and constrain the ensuing discussion to just specific
factors7.
As the case of binocular rivalry illustrates (Figure 2A; see
Miller, 2013a, in press-b), there are many (specific factor) NCrCs
for a given conscious state and these can include specific brain
regions or specific neural populations within brain regions. In
the Jenga analogy, each NCrC block can thus be considered
representative of a specific factor NCrC at either local, distributed
or regional levels8. The first step in the stepwise inhibition strat-
egy is to use recording techniques to create an NCrC specific
factor map for a specific (target) conscious state. Several further
stipulations for the Jenga analogy are required. First, the entire
tower is considered to be the outcome of previous strategies to
“screen off ” irrelevant neural activities (Hohwy, 2009; Hohwy
and Bayne, in press). Hence, on this analogy, already screened
off would be (i) neural activities that do not correlate with
specific conscious states or content; (ii) neural activities that
correlate with specific conscious states or content, but do so
only in a loose fashion, in which the correlation can be broken
one way or another9; (iii) neural activities that correlate with
specific conscious states or content but whose precise timing
provides clear ascription of either upstream or downstream,
rather than constitutive, status (see Miller, in press-b for details;
7Bayne and Hohwy (2013; see also Hohwy and Bayne, in press) refer to
differentiating NCrCs, which are considered neural states that are selectively
implicated in particular kinds of conscious states in an already conscious
creature.
8As neurophysiological understanding develops, so too will the notion of
what an NCrC block could be taken to be in this analogy—that is, what
appropriate “units” of neurophysiological signaling will turn out to be. For
now, however, each block represents individual NCrCs such as those being
identified at various levels of constituents, organization and processes in
studies of binocular rivalry.
9In my view, and without wishing to undermine or dismiss these important
conceptual and methodological efforts, I consider the strategies so far pro-
posed to distinguish NCrC precursors/prerequisites, NCrC proper/substrate,
and NCrC consequences by de Graaf and Sack (in press) and Aru et al. (in
press) generally fall into this category, appealing to ever more refined means
of identifying loosely from tightly correlated neural activities. This refinement
certainly helps to close in on the constitution of consciousness but the Jenga
analogy begins only after application of such strategies.
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see also Aru et al., in press; de Graaf and Sack, in press;
Hohwy and Bayne, in press; Revonsuo, in press)10; and (iv) neural
activities that correlate with specific conscious states or content
but whose known mechanistic functions provide grounds for
clear ascription as non-constitutive11. What remains after such
a screening off process therefore, is a tower of neural activities
that tightly correlate with a specific conscious state or content and
whose precise timing or known mechanistic functions cannot be
used to accurately ascribe upstream, downstream, or constitutive
status12.
Second, NCrC blocks in the lower third of the tower (colored
yellow) represent tightly correlated non-constitutive upstream
activities (tightly correlated NCrC precursors or NCrC prereq-
uisites), those in the upper third (colored blue) represent tightly
correlated non-constitutive downstream activities (tightly corre-
lated NCrC consequences), and those in the middle third (colored
red) represent tightly correlated constitutive NCrCs (the NCnC).
Third, the upright tower at the critical point beyond which any
further block removal will result in its collapse and the disappear-
ance (or degradation) of the target conscious state represents the
minimally sufficient NCrC.
Consider now that each of the thus-defined tightly correlated
neural activity blocks in the Jenga tower can be described by only
one of the following conjunctions:
(i) non-constitutive and non-minimally sufficient
(ii) non-constitutive and minimally sufficient
(iii) constitutive and non-minimally sufficient
(iv) constitutive and minimally sufficient
Consider further, the following two possibilities (P), each of
which is to be considered in isolation (because complexities arise
when they are considered together):
Possibility 1 (P1): Considering all individual NCrCs that
have survived the screening off process, the possibility of non-
constitutive minimally sufficient NCrCs means that the mini-
mally sufficient NCrC could be a larger set of neural activities
than the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of
consciousness.
10With such a brief treatment here, I do not wish to downplay the importance
and complexity of timing in the brain with respect to correlations between
neural and phenomenal states. This issue is itself likely to be a source of
interpretive difficulty and hence there will be many cases in which such “clear
ascription” will not be possible. Indeed, this fact underscores the problems
being discussed in the present paper. Nonetheless, in cases for which clear
ascription appears possible, timing can be used to screen off candidates for
constitutive neural activity. For a detailed source on the issue of timing and
phenomenal consciousness, see Bachmann (2000) and for a more recent
example of timing studies, see Liu et al. (2009).
11I provided an example of this fourth category in my first explication
of the Cr/Cn distinction problem (Miller, 2001) in terms of the expected
correlated neural activity that would be found in subcortical nuclei controlling
eye movement tracking (optokinetic nystagmus) during rivalry with drifting
gratings. Despite being correlated with consciousness during such rivalry,
the known mechanistic function of eye movement nuclei suggests a non-
constitutive role for this individual NCrC.
12Herewith, I combine points (ii), (iii), and (iv) such that when I refer to tightly
correlated NCrCs, I mean to also include the precise timing and mechanistic
function issues.
Possibility 2 (P2): Imagining just the neural basis, mechanism,
substrate, or constitution of consciousness, the possibility of
redundancy (the possibility of constitutive non-minimally suffi-
cient NCrCs) means that the minimally sufficient NCrC could be
a smaller set of neural activities than the neural basis, mechanism,
substrate, or constitution of consciousness.
Suppose now, that the first five correlated non-constitutive
upstream activity blocks are removed but the conscious state
remains and the tower stays upright. Those NCrCs are therefore
non-minimally sufficient. Further suppose, however, that removal
of the sixth correlated non-constitutive upstream activity block
does lead to the disappearance (or degradation) of the conscious
state and to falling of the tower. That sixth NCrC is minimally
sufficient. But the Jenga analogy shows that an NCrC can be
minimally sufficient without necessarily being constitutive. In
this way, the minimally sufficient NCrC could be a larger set
of neural activities than the NCnC (Figure 1). The downstream
case is a little more complex (see Aru et al., in press; de Graaf
and Sack, in press; Hohwy and Bayne, in press; van Boxtel and
Tsuchiya, in press), and it is not always clear what should be
regarded as an upstream activity and what a downstream activity,
particularly given the unclear neurophysiological role of feed-
back. However, the difference between upstream and downstream
cases is not particularly important for the point I am making
and P1 is illustrated clearly with reference to just the upstream
case.
Next imagine the set of neural activities that is the NCnC
and consider that due to the possibility of redundancy in this
neural activity set, five NCrC blocks could be removed with-
out the disappearance (or degradation) of the conscious state
and with the tower remaining upright. Those five neural activ-
ities are therefore non-minimally sufficient despite being actu-
ally constitutive. Removal of the sixth correlated constitutive
neural activity block, however, takes the tower passed its criti-
cal point and the conscious state disappears (or degrades) and
the tower falls. This sixth NCrC block then is both constitu-
tive and minimally sufficient. In this way, the minimally suffi-
cient NCrC within this (imagined) constitutive neural activity
set could be a smaller set of neural activities than the NCnC
(Figure 1).
The issue of claiming larger versus smaller sets is complicated
when conceiving of P1 and P2 together, but the key message here
is not about the overall size of the different neural activity sets,
but rather that the minimally sufficient NCrC and the NCnC can
be different sets of neural activities. Other important complexities
include combinatorial and order complexities (i.e., whether the
critical block removal would be critical whenever it is removed,
or only when removed after removal of the previous five blocks,
or only after removal of the previous five blocks in that specific
order). Despite these complexities, what is important here is that
while the empirical strategy of stepwise inhibition can identify
an NCrC’s minimally sufficient status, it cannot identify its con-
stitutive status. As the Jenga analogy shows, and as depicted in
Figure 2 using the case of binocular rivalry, while stepwise inhi-
bition achieves identification of the minimally sufficient NCrC, it
cannot identify (i) which of the remaining blocks are constitutive
of the conscious state and which are not; or (ii) which of the
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FIGURE 1 | The Jenga analogy schematizes the stepwise inhibition
strategy inherent in distinguishing the merely sufficient from the
minimally sufficient NCrC and shows how the minimally sufficient NCrC
can differ from the NCnC. In all panels, the upright tower represents the
presence of a specific conscious state (or content) while in panels (A,B) the
fallen tower (rubble) represents the loss (or degradation) of that state. Each
block represents a perception-dependent NCrC that correlates with the
specific conscious state (i.e., a specific factor NCrC). The whole tower is what
remains after a process of screening off non-correlated neural activities and
NCrCs that are only loosely correlated with consciousness or whose precise
timing or known mechanistic function indicates they are not candidates for
the NCnC. Panels (A,C) depict real-world situations, while panels (B,D,E)
depict colored subdivisions that could only be identified if the Cr/Cn
distinction problem is solvable. In (B,D,E), yellow blocks represent tightly
correlated non-constitutive upstream activities (NCrC precursors/
prerequisites), blue blocks represent tightly correlated non-constitutive
downstream activities (NCrC consequences) and red blocks represent
correlated constitutive activities (the NCnC). The right tower in (B) represents
a more distributed depiction of the colored subdivisions than the left tower in
(B). In (C,D), the upright tower with NCrC blocks removed is at the critical
point beyond which any further block removal will result in the disappearance
(or degradation) of the conscious state and collapse of the tower. The upright
tower in (C,D) thus represents the minimally sufficient NCrC. Blocks in this
critical point tower have minimally sufficient status, while those removed
from it do not. In P1 (see main text), the possibility of non-constitutive
minimally sufficient NCrCs (remaining yellow and blue blocks in D) means that
the minimally sufficient NCrC could be a larger set of neural activities than the
neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of consciousness (i.e., the
tower in D is a larger set of blocks than the red middle third of the left tower
in B). In P2 (see main text), the possibility of redundancy in the NCnC (i.e., the
possibility of constitutive non-minimally sufficient NCrCs; removed red blocks
in E) means that the minimally sufficient NCrC could be a smaller set of
neural activities than the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution
of consciousness (i.e., the red remaining blocks in the tower in E is a smaller
set of blocks than the red middle third of the left tower in B; note P1 and P2
are not meant to be considered together—see main text). The stepwise
inhibition strategy can therefore be used to assign minimally sufficient status
to each block in the Jenga tower in (A) (thus the real-world situation of getting
from A to C). However, the Cr/Cn distinction problem claims that there are no
evident strategies to readily assign color status (constitutive red versus
non-constitutive yellow/blue) to each of the NCrC blocks (thus it is not clear
how to get from A to B). The analogy shows that although we might get from
(A) to (C) using the stepwise inhibition approach, this will not satisfy
consciousness science because we still cannot assign color status to either
the remaining or removed blocks in (C) (we cannot get from C to D). Through
this analogy it is claimed that the ultimate target of consciousness science is
not to identify the minimally sufficient NCrC, but rather to distinguish
constitutive (red) NCrCs from non-constitutive (yellow/blue) NCrCs. That is, it
is ultimately the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of
consciousness that we seek to understand and this construct can pick out a
different neural activity set from that of the minimally sufficient NCrC. Figure
and caption reprinted with permission from Miller (in press-b).
removed blocks are constitutive of the conscious state and which
are not13.
13It is important to note that the Jenga analogy is just that—an analogy.
It schematizes the stepwise inhibition approach to illustrate the points I am
making. There is certainly no implied direct equivalence between removing
a block from a tower of mechanically related blocks on the one hand, and
inhibiting a neuron, neural circuit or set of neural circuits within an exquisitely
complex, dynamic and inter-related neural system with the capacity for
functional and structural reorganization, on the other. Aside from differences
in complexity between a Jenga tower and a neural system, there are further
This is not to say that identifying the minimally sufficient
NCrC through stepwise inhibition would be an insignificant
points of difference such as the effect that inhibiting a neuron has on the
neuron’s milieu and on non-neural structures like nearby glia and vasculature
(Logothetis, 2010). Because of these issues, problems of interpretation can
arise with respect to whether it is the neural inhibition that is (or is not)
changing consciousness or it is the secondary physiological effects of that
inhibition. The same interpretive problems arise regarding neural stimulation
(discussed in the next section, where further caveats are raised).
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FIGURE 2 | The Cr/Cn distinction problem is clearly illustrated with
reference to the phenomenon of binocular rivalry. (A) Research using
electrophysiological (single-unit and local field potential), brain-imaging and
brain stimulation (and inhibition) approaches has identified a wide array of
NCrCs during binocular rivalry and related phenomena such as flash
suppression (for details, see Miller, 2013a, in press-b; for even further
electrophysiological NCrCs during rivalry and related phenomena, see
Figure 6 in Boly et al., 2013). The existence of multiple NCrCs during rivalry
raises the issue of which activities can be said to constitute a specific
conscious state rather than being merely correlated with it. There are
multiple hypotheses possible for which NCrCs are upstream from (i.e.,
precursors or prerequisites), which are downstream from (i.e.,
consequences), and which are constitutive of, consciousness. These
competing hypotheses are indicated by the color-coding alternatives in the
smaller panels (B–G, which follow the color coding of the Jenga analogy in
Figure 1). While this NCrC array could be subjected to the stepwise
inhibition strategy underlying the notion of the minimally sufficient NCrC,
the problem of assigning the appropriate color-coding to each NCrC cannot
be solved with the same strategy because of the Cr/Cn distinction problem.
There are several caveats to interpreting this figure, including issues such
as: not all neurons in each area will exhibit perception-dependent firing
(e.g., V1/V2, V4, middle temporal area, MT); even when perception-
dependent in V4 and MT, this includes a proportion of neurons with the
opposite expected firing pattern (i.e., lower firing rates when their preferred
stimulus is perceived and higher firing rates when their preferred stimulus
is suppressed); some of the regions correlate with transitions between
rivaling states (or with reporting of such states) rather than with the visual
states themselves; some regions are targets of rivalry temporal parameter
modulation rather than consciousness modulation per se; regions engaged
in attentional selection and top-down modulation could be considered
either upstream or downstream activities; and there may be important
binding mechanisms that physiologically link individual NCrCs (see main
text). Figure reprinted and caption adapted with permission from Miller (in
press-b).
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achievement for consciousness science. On the contrary, it would
be a major achievement. However, the problem remains of just
how science will experimentally distinguish the neural activity sets
of the minimally sufficient NCrC and the NCnC (or if these are in
fact the very same sets, how this can be shown to be the case).
In my view then, the minimally sufficient NCrC construct should
not be considered the ultimate empirical target for consciousness
science because it could include neural activities that are not
part of the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution
of consciousness (P1) and it could exclude neural activities that
are (P2). The minimally sufficient NCrC notion, for all its worth,
subtly shifts the target of consciousness science to an empirically
tractable one, while the real target remains elusive due to the
Cr/Cn distinction problem.
STEPWISE STIMULATION AND COMBINED
INHIBITION/STIMULATION
If recording strategies make evident the Cr/Cn distinction prob-
lem and stepwise inhibition can identify an NCrC’s minimally
sufficient but not constitutive status, what might the strategy of
neural stimulation achieve? And indeed, exactly how would such
a strategy be applied in the context of studying consciousness?
Perhaps the first distinction required here is that between stim-
ulation of currently inactive NCrCs and those already active. On
the one hand, stimulation of already active correlated neurons,
neuron types, local or distributed neural circuits, brain regions
or sets of NCrCs, would generally not be expected to change a
conscious state (irrespective of whether these stimulated NCrCs
are constitutive or not). On the other hand, when stimulating
currently inactive correlated neurons, neuron types, local or
distributed neural circuits, brain regions or sets of NCrCs, a
changed conscious state might suggest a constitutive role for such
NCrCs but such a role is not proven by this strategy. This is
because the stimulated NCrC might in fact be non-constitutive
with its stimulation simply activating downstream NCrCs that
are constitutive. In this case there may be conclusions possible
regarding the causal chain of neural processing for that state, but
there are no corollaries regarding the NCnC14.
What about combinations of inhibition and stimulation? I have
previously asserted (Miller, 2007, p. 165) that, “by recording
14This is not the place to discuss in detail the difference between the causation
and constitution relation. Suffice to say, I believe the causation relation should
be restricted to usage in which one neural activity causes another (hence
in the context of causal chain processing) or in the context of mechanistic
explanation in which a mechanism or operational part has causal influence
on other mechanisms or operational parts (see Craver, 2007 for more on
the distinction between causal/etiological and constitutive mechanisms). I do
not think the causation relation should be used in the context of the brain–
mind relation. That is, brain states constitute mental states, or are identical
with them, or realize them, or the relation is one of supervenience, but brain
states do not cause mental states. These matters are taken up in much greater
detail in various papers in Miller (in press-a). For the view that causation
is in fact the relevant brain–mind relation, see Neisser (2012). On the issue
of mental causation (i.e., whether mental states could cause brain states and
behavior), I do not address this at all, but a constitution, identity, realization or
supervenience relation would not preclude mental states causing other brain
states and consequent behavior—these relations would just preclude mental
states causing their own brain states.
from, disabling and stimulating various NCrCs, there do not seem
to be any obvious corollaries regarding the NCnC.” However,
development of the Jenga analogy now leads me to reassess
this assertion. Consider the following experimental scenario—the
reverse Jenga strategy—which might at least in principle, and par-
tially, address issues of constitution. This strategy again requires a
highly specific and powerful inhibitory, and now also stimulatory,
technical capacity, i.e., the ability to selectively inhibit, disinhibit,
and stimulate specifically tagged neurons, neuron-types, local
or distributed neural circuits, specific brain regions and sets of
NCrCs. Note here also that stimulation is a further physiological
step beyond mere disinhibition to resting state activity. It is also to
be noted that the arguments above and below concern inhibition
and stimulation of excitatory rather than inhibitory neurons,
though it is acknowledged that (i) physiological inhibitory neural
activity is a fundamental feature of cortical microcircuits and is
“electrically inseparable from excitation” (Borchers et al., 2012,
p. 66); (ii) neurons that correlate with a specific conscious state by
decreasing their firing rate are not addressed by these arguments;
and (iii) modulation of neural activity is not addressed by these
arguments. All of these issues (and those in footnote 13) make the
arguments I wish to present more complex than is required at this
stage, but I do not discount their relevance.
Again optogenetics comes to mind when positing a highly
specific and powerful inhibitory and stimulatory technique and it
is worth quoting in full, the first two paragraphs of a recent review
of this technique (Fenno et al., 2011, p. 390, square brackets in
original):
In describing unrealized prerequisites for assembling a general the-
ory of mind, Francis Crick observed that the ability to manipulate
individual components of the brain would be needed, requiring “a
method by which all neurons of just one type could be inactivated,
leaving the others more or less unaltered” (Crick 1979, p. 222).
Extracellular electrical manipulation does not readily achieve true
inactivation, and even electrical excitation, while allowing for
temporal precision in stimulating within a given volume, lacks
specificity for cell type. However, pharmacological and genetic
manipulations can be specific to cells with certain expression
profiles (in the best case) but lack temporal precision on the
timescale of neural coding and signaling.
Because no prior technique has achieved both high-temporal
and cellular precision within intact mammalian neural tissue,
there has been strong pressure to develop a new class of technol-
ogy. As a result of these efforts, neurons now may be controlled
with optogenetics for fast, specific excitation or inhibition within
systems as complex as freely moving mammals [for example, with
microbial opsin methods, light-induced inward cation currents
may be used to depolarize the neuronal membrane and posi-
tively modulate firing of action potentials, while optical pumping
of chloride ions can induce outwards currents and membrane
hyperpolarization, thereby inhibiting spiking (Figure 1)]. These
optogenetic tools of microbial origin (Figure 1) may be readily
targeted to subpopulations of neurons within heterogeneous tissue
and function on a temporal scale commensurate with physiolog-
ical rates of spiking or critical moments in behavioral tests, with
fast deactivation upon cessation of light. With these properties,
microbe-derived optogenetic tools fulfill the criterion set forth by
Crick in 1979 (Deisseroth 2010, 2011).
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Others have commented on the prospects for consciousness
science offered by optogenetics (e.g., Tononi and Koch, 2008)15.
The technique has recently been applied in mice to examine
top-down modulation of visual processing (Zhang et al., 2014)
and can be applied in Drosophila in the context of visual rivalry
(Miller et al., 2012). For examples of brain stimulation techniques
currently applicable in humans, including those already applied
or capable of being applied to binocular rivalry, such as tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation, vestibular stimulation techniques,
transcranial direct current stimulation, and electrical microstim-
ulation, see Been et al. (2007), Borchers et al. (2012), Cohen and
Newsome (2004), Histed et al. (2013), Klink et al. (2013), Law
et al. (2013), Ngo et al. (2013), Reppas and Newsome (2007),
Sengpiel (2013), Sterzer (2013), and Thomson and Fitzgerald
(2013). Despite the value of such techniques for stimulating
(and in some cases inhibiting) neural activity, they entail various
disadvantages and interpretive complexities such as: (i) whether
they in fact cause stimulation or inhibition; (ii) their spatial
imprecision and hence unintended effects on other local and
regional neural targets; (iii) individual variation, regional varia-
tion, and neuronal morphological variation in stimulatory and
inhibitory thresholds (and consequent perceptual and behavioral
effects); and (iv) the ability of such techniques to be detected
by the subject. The in principle “pure” inhibition/stimulation
methodology on which the arguments in the present paper are
grounded would avoid these problems, as far as is physiologically
possible. And of course, knowing just how far this is physiolog-
ically possible will require a great deal of further neurophysio-
logical understanding (see, for example, the interpretive cautions
outlined by Logothetis, 2010, regarding emerging optogenetic
studies).
Nonetheless, with an optogenetics-style technique as an
example of the type of in principle methodology to which I
am referring, consider that the first step in the reverse Jenga
scenario is to use recording techniques to create a tightly cor-
related NCrC specific factor map for a specific (target) con-
scious state16. Next, leaving enabling factor NCrCs untouched,
15Indeed, Tononi and Koch (2008, p. 257) note in their update of the NCrC
program:
The growing ability of neuroscientists to manipulate in a reversible, tran-
sient, deliberate, and delicate manner identified populations of neurons
using methods from molecular biology combined with optical stimulation
enables the intrepid neuroengineer to move from correlation—observing
that a particular conscious state is associated with some neural or hemody-
namic activity—to causation.
While agreeing with such a sentiment, I would argue that the intrepid neuro-
engineer should wish to go beyond not just the correlates of consciousness, but
also beyond causation (see footnote 14), to ultimately reach the constitution
of consciousness.
16The reverse Jenga strategy could theoretically be applied without a specific
factor NCrC map first being identified with recording techniques (though the
consequent trial and error task would be far more onerous). Such a scenario
might be envisaged if developments in highly precise combined inhibition
and stimulation technologies occur more rapidly than developments in highly
precise recording technologies. However, this is perhaps unlikely given opto-
genetics, for example, is not just an inhibition and stimulation technique but
is also itself a recording technique. Hence developments in its (safe) recording
all previously mapped specific factor NCrCs are inhibited17.
In addition, all non-correlated causal chain components, and
all loosely correlated NCrCs, are inhibited. The crucial final
intervention then is to stepwise disinhibit and activate (stim-
ulate) each previously mapped tightly correlated specific fac-
tor NCrC. Under these circumstances, if the target conscious
state is reported18 then this would seem to provide the
strongest evidence possible that the disinhibited and stimu-
lated NCrC is actually constitutive (and thus has constitutive
status).
Note that in the case of P1 with the stepwise inhibition
strategy, the reason a non-constitutive but minimally sufficient
NCrC is minimally sufficient is because of its input to the NCnC
(i.e., its role in causal chain processing, albeit in this case, a
correlated rather than non-correlated causal chain role). With-
out such minimally sufficient non-constitutive NCrC activity,
there could not be the required activity in the NCnC and there
could not thus be the conscious state. However, in the reverse
Jenga case just described, the NCnC is directly activated (stim-
ulated) and thus, unlike the stepwise inhibition case, there is
no dependency on minimally sufficient non-constitutive NCrCs.
So in the reverse Jenga case, with this dependency condition
removed, if the target conscious state appears with particular
NCrC stimulation—and with other NCrCs inhibited, given the
strategy is a stepwise combined inhibition/stimulation process—
this reasonably implies constitutive status of the stimulated
NCrC.
With the reverse Jenga strategy, we are thus able to build
the middle third of the tower to its critical point of mini-
mal sufficiency. Indeed, by identifying the tower at this criti-
cal point of just its middle third, it can be stated that what
has in fact been identified is the minimally sufficient NCnC19.
The reverse Jenga approach thus, arguably (see later), provides
partial solution to the Cr/Cn distinction problem because it
overcomes the obstacle of P1 and identifies some constitutive
neural activities. However, to fully solve the Cr/Cn distinc-
tion problem, we need to achieve identification of the whole
set of constitutive neural activities. To do that would require
also overcoming the obstacle of P2 which would involve iden-
capacity are likely to occur more or less concurrently with developments in its
(safe) inhibitory and stimulatory capacity.
17It is not clear what it would be like for a subject to be in a state in which all
specific factor NCrCs were inhibited but all enabling factor NCrCs remained
active, but this is an issue I have side-stepped and is debated elsewhere (Noë
and Thompson, 2004; Hohwy, 2009; Hohwy and Bayne, in press; Neisser,
2012). Confusion could also arise if one were to describe non-constitutive
causal chain specific factor processes as themselves enabling factors, so this
should be avoided. Enabling factors should be restricted to those neural
activities present for all conscious states in a conscious creature.
18Neural activity for reporting will thus also need to remain untouched; this of
course raises issues of access versus phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995,
1996; discussed in Klink et al., in press) but again this is not my point here. For
more on reporting and downstream NCrCs, see Aru et al. (in press); de Graaf
and Sack (in press); Hohwy and Bayne (in press), and van Boxtel and Tsuchiya
(in press).
19In the case of combined inhibition/stimulation (and indeed, only in this
case), the minimally sufficient NCrC and the minimally sufficient NCnC can
be considered equivalent constructs.
www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1293 | 9
Miller Closing in on the constitution of consciousness
FIGURE 3 | The Jenga analogy illustrates notions of redundancy in
the NCnC and non-radical neural multiple realizability. The isolated
stimulation strategy is (arguably) able to identify at least some
constitutive neural activities (red colored blocks), specifically the minimally
sufficient NCnC (B), though it is not able to identify the boundaries of the
whole NCnC (A). Hence while (B) may be identified using isolated
stimulation, we are not able to get from (B) to (A) with this method.
Moreover, the isolated stimulation strategy could demonstrate that more
than one subset of constitutive neural activities is minimally sufficient
constitutive neural activity (e.g., C and D) and if so, (B), (C), and (D) would
be non-radical neural multiple realizations of a specific conscious state.
Figure and caption reprinted with permission from Miller (in press-b).
tifying not just the middle third of the tower at its critical
point of minimal sufficiency, but the exact boundaries of that
(whole) middle third (i.e., the exact boundaries of the NCnC;
Figure 3).
To show why the reverse Jenga approach fails to fully solve the
Cr/Cn distinction problem, consider the following further specific
combined inhibition/stimulation scenarios (herewith I refer to
the combined inhibition/stimulation approach as “isolated stimu-
lation”). First, isolated stimulation of non-constitutive NCrCs in
the bottom or top third of the tower—whether they are minimally
sufficient NCrCs or not—would not induce the target conscious
state. Consequently, these NCrCs can be reasonably excluded as
constitutive neural activities. Second, after the conscious state first
appears due to isolated stimulation of the minimally sufficient
NCnC, and then as redundantly constitutive NCrCs are addi-
tionally disinhibited and stimulated, the conscious state will not
change, so this will not allow a distinction to be made between
redundantly constitutive NCrCs and non-constitutive NCrCs.
Hence the whole set of constitutive neural activities cannot be
identified.
The next isolated stimulation scenario is also informative.
Thus, we can ask what would occur with isolated stimulation of
redundantly constitutive NCrCs when the minimally sufficient
NCnC is not also stimulated (i.e., whether that would induce the
conscious state). Here the issue depends on the nature of the
redundancy and the notion of neural multiple realizability (see
Miller, 2007). That is, it may be that the minimally sufficient
NCnC is a fixed set of neural activities for a particular conscious
state, without activation of which there will never be that con-
scious state. In such a scenario—which invokes the notion of
necessity rather than sufficiency—the usual case would involve
a conscious state being constituted by activation of that fixed
minimally sufficient neural set and by any additional redundantly
constitutive neural activities. But another alternative is that the
minimally sufficient NCnC may be a variable set of neural activ-
ities for a particular conscious state, such that separate isolated
stimulation of two or more different sets of neural activities could
induce (and constitute) the target conscious state, even though
in the normal case both or all of these sets are constitutive.
This would be a case of neural multiple realizability, whereby
two or more different neural states could nonetheless constitute
the same phenomenal state20. Note that this notion of neural
multiple realizability, however, is still one in which redundancy
is involved.
There is yet another, perhaps extreme, alternative in which
neural multiple realizability could occur without any involvement
of redundancy. That is, it could be that the whole scenario of
isolated stimulation radically changes the NCnC, such that neural
activities that are never constitutive in the normal case (perhaps
tightly correlated upstream or downstream NCrCs) become con-
stitutive in the case of isolated stimulation. We might describe
this as radical neural multiple realizability, in which isolated
stimulation of non-constitutive NCrCs in the bottom or top third
of the tower—whether they are minimally sufficient or not—
could conceivably induce (and constitute) the target conscious
state. If this extreme scenario were to hold, it would mean
that constitutive neural activities would still be identified by the
isolated stimulation strategy but that such constitutive activity
would bear no relationship to constitutive activity in the normal
case. Achieving that identification would be far less relevant to
consciousness science than achieving identification of constitutive
activity in the normal case.
While radical neural multiple realizability cannot be totally
excluded as a possibility, its likelihood can be questioned. That
is, while the brain exhibits remarkable capacity for rapid and
substantial plastic change—such as reorganization of somatosen-
sory maps following deafferentation (Merzenich et al., 1983;
20Note that in philosophy, multiple realizability refers to functional roles,
including consciousness, being realized by any substrate, not just neural
activity, with such roles thus being substrate-independent. My interest in
multiple realizability, however, concerns just neural multiple realizability. In
Miller (2007), I argued that within the bounds of the problem of direct
intersubjective exchange and the Cr/Cn distinction problem, the science of
consciousness could nonetheless make progress on issues of neural multiple
realizability. As it turns out, such progress was already underway, utilizing the
phenomenon of rivalry (Maier et al., 2007). These investigators examined the
perception-dependency of single-unit responses to a variety of bistable stimuli
and showed, amongst other findings, that the same perceptual state can be
correlated with different neural activity patterns in macaque middle temporal
(MT) area.
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Ramachandran et al., 1992; Weiss et al., 2000)—such changes
nonetheless take days to weeks to occur. While radical neural
multiple realizability for a specific conscious state may be highly
probable after days to weeks, for it to confound the isolated stimu-
lation strategy, it would need to involve more or less instantaneous
reorganization of the NCnC. Instantaneous reorganization of the
NCnC in this way would seem highly improbable.
Non-radical neural multiple realizability (Figure 3), however,
is a far more likely possibility, as is redundancy in the NCnC,
certainly in the case of within-region neural activity (see next
section and footnote 20). Both non-radical neural multiple real-
izability and redundancy, given their higher probability, challenge
consciousness science and account for the isolated stimulation
strategy’s failure to identify the exact boundaries of the NCnC.
To reiterate what each possibility involves, recall P2 above in the
case of redundancy, and in the case of non-radical neural multiple
realizability, we can state:
Possibility 3 (P3): Non-radical neural multiple realizability
involves the possibility that more than one subset of constitutive
neural activity can be minimally sufficient for a conscious state
when separately subjected to isolated stimulation.
In summary then, with the isolated stimulation empirical
strategy, while the obstacle of P1 is overcome (arguably, see
later), the obstacles of P2 and P3 are not. And while min-
imally sufficient constitutive neural activities might be iden-
tified by isolated stimulation, redundantly constitutive neural
activities cannot be distinguished from non-constitutive neural
activities (P2) and hence the whole NCnC cannot be identified.
Moreover, initially identified minimally sufficient constitutive
neural activities may turn out to not be the only minimally
sufficient constitutive neural activities (P3). Nonetheless, the
reverse Jenga scenario may enable identification of some con-
stitutive neural activities (indeed, minimally sufficient constitu-
tive neural activities) and such identification would represent
very significant progress in consciousness science. However,
because this strategy fails to identify the exact boundaries
of the NCnC, the Cr/Cn distinction problem is not solved
and we may therefore only close in on the constitution of
consciousness21,22.
CLARIFICATIONS
At this stage, some points of clarification are required before
proceeding to discussing potential objections to the presented
arguments, and then to proposing new foundational claims for
consciousness science.
21Given the redundancy problem (P2), the “closing in” notion may be mis-
leading because isolated stimulation would actually overshoot such closing in,
through its exclusion of redundantly constitutive neural activities. Nonethe-
less, identification of at least some constitutive neural activity is what is meant
by “closing in” on the problem.
22For a detailed analysis of many of the principles I have been discussing
from the perspective of philosophy of science, see Craver (2007). Craver’s
analysis includes discussion (with specific scientific examples) of notions of
mere correlates, interference and stimulation interventions, redundancy, and
constitutive relevance (on the latter, see footnote 24). He provides examples
of scientific approaches to dealing with redundancy, but not in the context of
consciousness.
BETWEEN- ANDWITHIN-REGION CASES
When considering the notions of redundancy in the NCnC (P2)
and non-radical neural multiple realizability (P3), it should be
noted that these possibilities apply both between and within
specific brain regions. In Figure 2, the stepwise inhibition strategy
and the obstacles of P1 and P2 were illustrated for the case of
binocular rivalry. This phenomenon also serves to illustrate P2
and P3 in the between- and within-region cases. Thus, con-
straining our analysis to perception-dependent neural activities
(which the Jenga and reverse Jenga analogies require), and setting
aside the fact that rivalry is not normal vision, consider the
following.
In the between-region case, a visual state (during rivalry, with
motion, color and complex images) is constituted say, by IT/STS
(inferior temporal/superior temporal sulcus) neural activity and
V4/MT (middle temporal) neural activity (this being the whole
specific factor NCnC for each rivaling state), but (i) the visual
state would not be affected by inhibition of V4/MT activity
because V4/MT activity is redundantly constitutive; and (ii) iso-
lated stimulation of IT/STS neurons induces the visual state and
is thus minimally sufficient constitutive neural activity for it,
but isolated stimulation of V4/MT activity does not induce the
visual state and thus is not minimally sufficient constitutive neural
activity for it; or (iii) separate isolated stimulation of either IT/STS
or V4/MT induces the visual state and thus both can be considered
minimally sufficient constitutive neural activity for it (and non-
radical multiple realizations of it).
In the within-region case, a visual state during rivalry is
constituted say, by IT/STS neural activity (this being the whole
specific factor NCnC for each rivaling state), but (i) the visual
state would not be affected by inhibition of some IT/STS neural
activity because that inhibited activity is redundantly constitutive;
and (ii) isolated stimulation of some IT/STS activity induces the
visual state and is thus minimally sufficient constitutive neural
activity for it, but isolated stimulation of the remaining (or some
other) IT/STS activity does not induce the visual state and is thus
not minimally sufficient constitutive neural activity for it; or (iii)
separate isolated stimulation of either some IT/STS activity or of
remaining (or some other) IT/STS activity induces the visual state
and thus both can be considered minimally sufficient constitutive
neural activity for it (and non-radical multiple realizations of it).
While the between-region case above is certainly conceivable,
the within-region case, especially for the redundancy possibility
(P2), must be considered highly probable. That is, it is highly
probable that thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thou-
sands or millions of neurons are specific factor constituents for a
conscious state, and it is highly improbable that every one of them
would need to be active to constitute that state. Hence it is highly
improbable that every one of them would need to be stimulated
in the isolated stimulation case, to induce (and constitute) the
target state. Within-region redundancy also raises further issues
of importance for consciousness science and I address these later
when considering an objection to the redundancy argument.
It is important to also be mindful in this context, how-
ever, of existing data from electrical microstimulation studies.
It is a remarkable fact from such studies that stimulation of
relatively few MT neurons (perhaps just hundreds) can bias a
www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1293 | 11
Miller Closing in on the constitution of consciousness
monkey’s perceptual decision regarding motion direction (Britten
et al., 1992; Salzman and Newsome, 1994; Ditterich et al., 2003;
Cohen and Newsome, 2004, 2009; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013; see
Sengpiel, 2013, for discussion of this data in the context of
binocular rivalry and for the point that microstimulation has
never been applied to rivalry). One cannot necessarily extrapolate
from those studies, however, in which stimulation of relatively few
neurons can influence discrimination under difficult decision-
making conditions, to the notion that there will be similarly few
neurons constitutive for a specific conscious state. That is, it does
not follow that the number of neurons it takes to bias competition
within pools of active neurons, and to thus influence a subject’s
difficult decision, is equivalent to the number of specific factor
neurons constituting a conscious state. There may be similarly few
neurons determining competition between conscious states (such
as during rivalry) but this is a different matter to the number of
specific factor neurons constituting each state.
Nonetheless, it may turn out that the activity of fewer neurons
than we expect is the (specific factor) neural basis, mechanism,
substrate, or constitution of a conscious state. This will, at the
end of the day, be an empirical matter that strategies like isolated
stimulation, should they come to pass, will determine. It is also
noteworthy that Newsome himself is not afraid to examine the
issue of just what his and his contemporaries’ microstimula-
tion work means for the issue of the neural basis, mechanism,
substrate, or constitution of subjective experience (Cohen and
Newsome, 2004; Reppas and Newsome, 2007). He concludes
(Reppas and Newsome, 2007, p. 7) that, “The development of
a non-invasive technique to modify precisely and locally neural
activity in humans will probably be necessary to address such
questions satisfactorily.”
LINKING, BINDING, OR INDEX PROCESSES
I have previously acknowledged (Miller, 2007) that searching for
this or that NCrC or set of NCrCs might be misguided and that it
is instead a neurophysiological process linking or binding multiple
NCrCs, such as, for example, recurrent processing (Lamme, 2006,
2010; see also Klink et al., in press) or oscillatory activity and
temporal synchrony (Singer, 2001; Fries, 2005; Fries et al., 2005;
though see Shadlen and Movshon, 1999; see also Sengpiel, 2013),
that indexes the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitu-
tion of consciousness. It is certainly possible that physiological
processes between, or that bind, individual NCrCs could index
phenomenally conscious neural activity over and above the tight
correlations observed in each of those individual NCrCs. But if
so, there will likely be various sets of recurrently, temporally or
otherwise bound NCrCs for a conscious state, and we can ask
which set should be assigned constitutive status and how will
various hypotheses in this regard be tested. Perhaps each bound
neural set could be considered an “individual” NCrC and the
same obstacles of P1–P3 would apply.
Alternatively, even if there are not various sets of indexed or
bound neural activities—because all such sets should rather be
considered just one larger set—there can still be various hypothe-
ses proposed regarding whether all individual NCrC components
of that one larger set are constitutive, or just some. In other
words, it can be claimed that a neurophysiological process linking
or binding various individual NCrCs, indexes the neural basis,
mechanism, substrate, or constitution of consciousness, but it
is a further claim to hold that all neurons or all brain regions
participating in such a process are constitutive. That further
claim is itself a hypothesis, with rival hypotheses being based
on the notion that only some neurons, neuron types, local or
distributed neural circuits, specific brain regions or sets of NCrCs
participating in the index/binding process are constitutive.
To test hypotheses in this regard would require intervening
through stepwise inhibition and stepwise isolated stimulation
to prevent and reintroduce, respectively, the relevant index or
binding process, and observing what happens to the conscious
state in each case. In such experiments, it may turn out that in
the absence of the index or binding process there is never the
conscious state and this would certainly inform consciousness
science. But it may also turn out that inhibition of one component
of an indexed/bound neural set does not lead to the absence
of the index/binding process in remaining components of the
set and does not lead to a change in the target conscious state.
Would that inhibited component therefore be considered non-
constitutive or redundantly constitutive? And could isolated stim-
ulation of various subsets of indexed/bound NCrCs be minimally
sufficient constitutive neural activity? The index/binding process
case does not seem to enable us to avoid the obstacles of P1 and
P2 for stepwise inhibition and P2 and P3 for stepwise isolated
stimulation.
A CAVEAT ON ISOLATED STIMULATION
The final point of clarification relates to earlier reference to iso-
lated stimulation only arguably enabling identification of at least
some constitutive neural activities. That is, the above discussion
of possible index processes that link or bind different neural
activities raises an important potential complication for the iso-
lated stimulation strategy. A scenario could be postulated whereby
isolated stimulation of the (putative) minimally sufficient NCnC
could fail to induce the target conscious state if that neural activity
set required for its correct functioning, intact connections to
other (disinhibited and active) neural activity sets (such as non-
correlated causal chain components, loosely correlated NCrCs
or tightly correlated non-constitutive NCrCs). Such a scenario
would potentially then lead to an inability to distinguish the min-
imally sufficient NCnC and non-constitutive minimally sufficient
NCrCs (and even non-correlated causal chain components) and
this is precisely the obstacle of P1. In such a scenario therefore,
it could be claimed that isolated stimulation does not in fact
overcome the obstacle of P1. This is a concern addressed further
at the end of the next section, where I discuss a potential objection
based on a postulated requirement for intact connection even to
disinhibited and inactive neural sets.
OBJECTIONS
There are at least six potential objections to the arguments pre-
sented thus far. Each of these is discussed in detail in Miller
(in press-b). Here I list three of these and then discuss in detail
only the three most relevant to the presented arguments. The
objections not discussed here include: (i) Definition objections—
that Chalmers’ (2000) definition of the minimally sufficient
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NCrC, including his discussion of redundancy technicalities,
would exclude the sorts of scenarios I have discussed; (ii) Speci-
ficity objection—that the Cr/Cn distinction problem may not
be specific to consciousness science, but rather applies in many
scientific domains; and (iii) Theoretical loading objection—that
the very notion of constitution is theoretically loaded (regarding
the relation between mind and brain) in a way that the notion of
correlation is not.
TRIVIALITY OBJECTION
Another potential objection is that it could be claimed that redun-
dancy (P2) and non-radical neural multiple realizability (P3) are
but trivial possibilities. This objection would hold that if we
had identified the minimally sufficient NCnC using the isolated
stimulation strategy, we need not be concerned about failing to
go on to achieve identification of the whole NCnC because any
differences between these two neural activity sets is trivial. There
are two responses to this objection and both draw on the notion
of explanation in consciousness science (a notion discussed more
fully in Chalmers, 1996; Revonsuo, 2000, 2001, 2006, in press;
Hohwy and Frith, 2004; Bayne, 2007; Hohwy, 2007, 2009; Seth,
2009; Neisser, 2012; Drayson, in press; Hohwy and Bayne, in press;
Keaton, in press; Miller, in press-b; Opie and O’Brien, in press).
Explanation is a somewhat vexed issue in consciousness sci-
ence because of “the hard problem” discussed by Chalmers (1996)
in which even identification of the whole NCnC could still leave
unanswered questions such as how it is that that particular set
of neural activities constitutes consciousness and why it is that
there should be any consciousness at all. Despite the possibility
of explanatory gaps in the study of consciousness (Levine, 1983),
some degree of explanation can still be sought and achieved in
the scientific study of consciousness, in particular with respect to
the notion of mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences
(Bechtel, 1994; Machamer et al., 2000; Revonsuo, 2000, 2001,
2006, in press; Craver, 2007; Horst, 2007; Neisser, 2012; Oizumi
et al., 2014; Hohwy and Bayne, in press; Mahner, in press; Miller,
in press-b; Opie and O’Brien, in press; cf. Irvine, 2013, who
appeals to mechanistic explanation to argue why there cannot
even be a science of consciousness)23.
It could be argued, as Jakob Hohwy has pointed out to me,
that we need not worry about identifying redundantly constitutive
neural activities because if a conscious state does not disappear (or
degrade) when a redundantly constitutive NCrC is inhibited, then
the difference between the minimally sufficient NCnC and the
whole NCnC, is a difference-without-a-difference (and any such
difference is therefore trivial). As such, the argument would hold
that, being redundant, the unidentified constitutive NCrCs could
do no explanatory work even if they were identifiable. My reply,
however, is that a difference-without-a-difference for conscious-
ness does not amount to a difference-without-a-difference for
consciousness science.
23The arguments I have presented thus far have considered the terms neu-
ral “basis,” “mechanism,” “substrate,” and “constitution” of consciousness
as synonymous, but in the context of mechanistic explanation, the term
“mechanism” has its own implications (just as the “constitution” term has its
own implications also; see later).
That is, we can reasonably wish to answer the following
questions: (i) is there in fact any redundancy in the NCnC?
(ii) if so, why should there be such redundancy? (iii) is such
redundancy based on a critical size of neural activities (a critical
number of involved neurons, neuron types and neural circuits)?
(iv) is such redundancy based on a critical location of neural
activities? (v) is such redundancy based on a critical combination
of stepwise inhibition when applying that empirical strategy? (vi)
is such redundancy based on a critical order of stepwise inhibition
when applying that empirical strategy? (vii) is there non-radical
neural multiple realizability within the NCnC (which draws on
the notion of redundancy) when applying the isolated stimulation
empirical strategy? (viii) and how does such redundancy relate
to index or binding processes? Answers to such questions would
seem, in my view, far from devoid of explanatory power (just
as understanding many such issues would help to mechanistically
explain when and why a Jenga tower might fall).
The second response to the triviality objection rests on the fact
that the major element of the scientific study of consciousness,
at least currently, is the search not for explanations as such,
but rather for identification of which neural activities are the
basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of consciousness.
This is fundamentally a process of identifying the relevant neural
activities, not of explaining how and why those activities do the
constituting. That is, the issue with which I have been concerned
in this paper (and with which consciousness science appears most
concerned) is one of determining inclusion and exclusion into the
constitutive neural activity set. Understanding explanatory mech-
anisms may of course help with this identification process, but
consciousness science could conceivably identify the NCnC even
without understanding some explanatory mechanistic principles
relevant to that neural activity set.
Hence in summary, appeals to the absence of explanatory
power in redundantly constitutive NCrCs do not support their
identification as trivial, because (i) issues regarding redundantly
constitutive NCrCs can in fact do explanatory work; and (ii)
despite their redundancy, redundantly constitutive NCrCs are
nonetheless constitutive activities and are thus legitimately part
of the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of
consciousness. As such, we should seek their identification and we
should consider what scientific strategies might achieve this goal.
WAIT-AND-SEE OBJECTION
A further potential objection concerns Crick and Koch’s (1998)
suggestion that hard problems of consciousness be set aside until
science makes more progress. It is not clear if such a caution
should include the Cr/Cn distinction problem given its clear
scientific relevance, but obviously in my view, it should not. That
said, there is certainly an important message in the wait-and-
see approach and indeed I have previously noted (Miller, 2007,
p. 165) that, “… future scientific work may show that the notion
of the Cr/Cn distinction is somehow fundamentally misguided (in
a way that cannot yet be appreciated because the science is not yet
done).” Similarly, Revonsuo (2006, p. 292) rightly cautions us over
imaginary neuroscience scenarios when he says: “In the absence of
the relevant empirical facts, we simply cannot imagine or foresee
the perfect future science regarding any phenomenon.”
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I am entirely accepting of the fact that as neuroscience
progresses, particularly with respect to dynamic mechanistic
multilevel explanation of neural processing within and outside
of consciousness science, any or all of the scenarios and claims
made in this paper (and its longer version) may require refine-
ment, revision or indeed rejection. For example, the technique of
optogenetics as applied in the context of the current paper would
also be capable of being applied in many other neuroscientific
contexts (e.g., sensory coding, voluntary movement and various
executive functions). As such application advances understanding
of neural coding, signaling, dynamics and function, and under-
standing of the relationship between neural processing and the
phenomena being studied, so too such understanding will have
flow-on implications for consciousness science. In addition to
optogenetics, developments will occur (as discussed in several
papers in Miller, 2013a) with other recording, inhibition, and
stimulation methods, and signal analysis approaches therein, to
improve the spatial and temporal resolution of each technique, to
enable combined methodological approaches, to accurately map
structural and functional neural connections, to improve neural
spike detection and sorting and neural population, source and
network modeling, to facilitate integration of knowledge across
the various levels targeted by each technique, and in general to
develop a more detailed understanding of subcellular, neural,
neural circuit, and large-scale/regional/systems processing.
Conversely, as neuroscientific understanding progresses, the
presented scenarios and claims may rather become strengthened
(for example, the claim that the isolated stimulation strategy
identifies some constitutive neural activities may not be ques-
tionable after all). Moreover, the presented scenarios and claims
may go beyond the realm of “in principle” and instead become
directly testable. Until there is development of a safe, reversible and
“pure” recording, inhibitory and stimulatory technique, it would
be unwise to not accept likely revision to the presented scenarios
and claims. Just as this and other neuroscientific progress will
help to disentangle the complexities of the microstimulation
and decision-making literature, and the broader neural coding
and processing issues within which those complexities lie (see
references in previous section; reviewed in Shadlen and Kiani,
2013; see also Sengpiel, 2013), so too it will help to disentangle the
complexities of recording, inhibition, and stimulation scenarios
within consciousness science. We may wish to wait and see on
such issues before getting too conceptually entangled, but in my
view it would be unwise to hold that the conceptual analyses
and proposals presented here should not be further discussed and
debated, or should not even have been embarked upon.
INTEGRATED INFORMATION THEORY OBJECTION
The final potential objection is that stemming from Integrated
Information Theory (IIT; Oizumi et al., 2014; see also Klink
et al., in press). IIT is a highly complex and developed theory of
consciousness, with its own detailed conceptual definitions and
tools, that starts with phenomenological axioms and proceeds
to formalize these into, “postulates that prescribe how physical
mechanisms, such as neurons or logic gates, must be configured
to generate experience (phenomenology)” (Oizumi et al., 2014,
p. 1). IIT is based heavily on mechanistic causal roles—though
specifically in IIT, and importantly in the present context, only
differences that make a difference—and involves perturbation
(again important in the present context) of the elements of candi-
date sets into all possible states, and identification of maximally
irreducible cause–effect repertoires and structure. IIT does not
permit for P1, P2, or P3 because it takes the inactive elements in
maximally irreducible cause–effect structure to be just as critical
as the active elements. Additionally, through an exclusion postu-
late, among overlapping candidate sets of mechanistic elements,
only one forms a complex—that with the maximum quantity
of integrated conceptual information—and hence no subsets or
supersets of those mechanistic elements can form a complex.
It will take someone better versed than myself in IIT to prop-
erly set out the detailed objections to P1, P2, and P3 that stem
from the theory, but from the brief description above, some clues
to the objections should be visible. The arguments presented in
this paper are based on an excitation approach to constitutive neu-
ral activity, albeit with an acknowledgment of the physiological
inseparability of excitatory and inhibitory processes (and other
caveats). However, IIT considers inactive (i.e., resting state, or
disinhibited and not stimulated) neural states to be just as critical
to the constitution (structure) of a conscious state as stimulated
neurons, and on this construal, the isolated stimulation scenario
I have been discussing would be considered inaccurate. Note
though, that this way of thinking would also lead to objecting
to the notion of the minimally sufficient NCrC, insofar as that
construct also relies on excitatory correlates rather than the set of
relevant active and inactive neural elements.
Instead, IIT would argue that the constitution of conscious-
ness is identifiable by identifying the (neural) complex with the
maximum quantity of integrated conceptual information and that
once this complex has been identified, adding anything to it or
subtracting anything from it must change the conscious state,
however minimal that change may be. On this construal and
on the axioms and postulates of IIT, P1, P2, and P3 are not
possibilities at all. This IIT objection to the present arguments
is testable, in principle, and if the identified complex with the
maximum quantity of integrated conceptual information can in
fact be added to or subtracted from without a concomitant change
in the conscious state, it will then be IIT that is found wanting.
RELATED SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES
There are many additional issues associated with the notion
of constitution and the Cr/Cn distinction problem, with both
explanatory and other theoretical implications (discussed in detail
in Miller, 2007, in press-a,b). For example, additional scientific
questions include: (i) what do the Cr/Cn distinction problem,
the Jenga analogy and the reverse Jenga analogy look like for
enabling rather than specific factors? (ii) what is the relation-
ship of the Cr/Cn distinction problem to other scientific and
philosophic consciousness problems—such as identifying where
in phylogeny and where in ontogeny phenomenal consciousness
exists, knowing what it is like to be another subject (the other
minds problem or problem of direct intersubjective exchange),
and the hard problem? (iii) if science meets an epistemic limit
with the Cr/Cn distinction problem, what is it about scientific
method that gives rise to such a limit?
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Another important scientific issue concerns at what level of
neural processing consciousness is constituted (Revonsuo, 2000,
2001, 2006, in press; Miller, 2007, in press-b; Hohwy and Bayne,
in press; Opie and O’Brien, in press)? This is another constitution
problem that both the science and philosophy of consciousness
will need to address. Thus, should the NCnC be considered most
relevant at the level only of constitutive action potentials? Or
perhaps at the level only of the electrophysiological processes of
distributed constitutive neural circuits and networks (bound as
they may or may not be)? Or perhaps both levels are constitutively
relevant? And what is the relation of NCnC microconstituents
(subcellular molecular constituents) to consciousness? Should the
NCnC be considered to include all microconstituent processes, or
only some? And if just some, which, and how will we test hypothe-
ses in this regard? In this context, the term “constitution” takes
on additional relevance over and above “basis,” “mechanism” and
“substrate” and specifically, different grains of constitution can
be appreciated—i.e., at coarse (systems), fine (individual neurons
and microcircuits), and very fine (subcellular) scales (see Miller,
in press-b).
Some of the additional philosophic issues have been alluded to
above in terms of other philosophic problems of consciousness.
Also, the issue of various grains of constitution suggests, in my
view, a mereology of phenomenal consciousness. Mereology is the
branch of philosophy that deals with the relationship between
parts and wholes. It has mostly concerned itself with analysis
of part-whole relations for static objects (see several papers in
Miller, in press-a) rather than process-based physiological systems.
It is my contention that the philosophy of consciousness needs
to (i) engage in mereological analysis of processes to better
understand part-whole relations of physiological and specifically
neural systems; and (ii) thereafter, focus on what additionally
may be relevant in considering a mereology of the NCnC. A
mereology of phenomenal consciousness will require concerted
interdisciplinary interaction amongst philosophers and scien-
tists, with updating of the analyses as neuroscientific knowledge
itself progresses. Extension of the classical mereological focus on
objects to (neurophysiological) processes should be undertaken to
complement mechanistic explanation approaches (which also deal
with component parts, and specifically their causal operations,
activities, and organization)—particularly dynamic mechanistic
explanation; see Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2010, 2013)—rather
than as an alternative to it24.
24The notion of a mereology of processes differs from the mechanistic
approach to activities in a subtle but potentially important way. Craver (2007,
p. 136) notes, “There are no mechanisms without active organisation, and no
mechanistic explanation is complete or correct if it does not capture correctly
the mechanism’s active organisation.” Craver’s notion of activities (Machamer
et al., 2000; Craver, 2007) is one with a decidedly mechanistic flavor. In
addition, Craver (2007) outlines the importance of attending to the notion
of constitutive relevance in mechanistic explanation (i.e., identifying relevant
components and their interactions and excluding irrelevant components and
their interactions). While this is no doubt indeed important for mechanistic
explanation—and for finding constitutive mechanisms of consciousness (as
sought by Revonsuo, 2006)—understanding the constitution of consciousness
may need to take more than just a mechanistic explanation form. Indeed,
this is why the title of this paper—“Closing in on the Constitution of
Consciousness”—stands in contrast to the title of a chapter in Revonsuo
Other relevant philosophic issues surrounding the notion of
constitution concern the perennial issue in philosophy of mind
of the relation between brain and mind. Thus, (i) what are the
similarities and differences between the constitution relation and
others that purport to describe the brain–mind relation, such
as identity, supervenience, realization, emergence, and causation?
(ii) is the constitution relation in the case of phenomenal con-
sciousness a unique constitution relation, and if so, unique how?
(iii) if indeed unique, does it simply look nothing like a consti-
tution relation in the usual parts-whole sense, even for processes?
(iv) does the uniqueness of the constitution relation in this par-
ticular case tell us something about the uniqueness of conscious-
ness and the place of consciousness in nature? Finally, another
perennial issue in philosophy of mind—the ontological issue of
whether consciousness and mind are entirely physically (mate-
rially) composed—is also relevant in the context of the Cr/Cn
distinction problem. If with the Cr/Cn distinction problem, sci-
ence meets an epistemic limit, what does this mean for these
ontological matters? For more detailed discussion of these related
scientific and philosophic issues, see Miller (2007, in press-a,b).
NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In this paper (and in Miller, in press-b), we have seen through the
Jenga analogy that the minimally sufficient NCrC construct can
pick out a different neural activity set to that of the NCnC. We
have also seen that while application of the stepwise inhibition
empirical strategy can distinguish the merely sufficient from the
minimally sufficient NCrC, it fails to make any progress on identi-
fying constitutive neural activities (due to P1 and P2). In addition,
while application of the isolated stimulation empirical strategy
can (arguably) identify some constitutive neural activities, it fails
to make any progress on identifying the whole NCnC (due to P2
and P3).
Although the Cr/Cn distinction problem remains unsolved,
as are other (mereological) consciousness constitution problems,
the analyses I have presented suggest new conceptual foundations
for consciousness science, depicted by the following claims (C).
These claims are proposed for further discussion and notably,
they include reference to specific empirical strategies and to pos-
sibilities P1–P3. There are many aspects of consciousness science
(2006)—“Closing in on the Mechanisms of Consciousness.” Although the
mechanistic explanation form may turn out to be the best way by which to
understand the constitution of consciousness, mereological approaches, in my
view, also need developing. This will not, however, be easy territory. Craver’s
(2007) use of the notion of “constitutive explanation” (used in the mechanistic
context) is not intended to have metaphysical relational implications. Thus he
notes (p. 20), “Metaphysicians reserve the term “constitutive” for a specific
relation that has more entanglements than I intend.” A metaphysical mereo-
logical notion of “constitutive” may well, I suggest, have different implications
for the notion of constitutive relevance than the mechanistic notion of “con-
stitutive.” Finally, in answering how we might test hypotheses regarding which
microconstituents can be considered part of the NCnC and which not (hence
which are constitutively relevant), microconstituent stepwise inhibition could
be applied, with assessment of whether a conscious state changes or does not
change accordingly. However, drawing conclusions from such interventions,
and determining whether a Cr/Cn distinction problem also exists at this
level (see Miller, in press-b), would seem to require the combination of
mereological and mechanistic analyses that I am advocating.
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not dealt with by these claims, so this is not intended to be an
exhaustive list. It is merely a list of claims arising from the main
analyses I have undertaken. The proposed claims are:
C1: Setting aside notions of the hard problem of conscious-
ness, the explanatory gap, hard phylogeny and ontogeny prob-
lems of consciousness, and the problem of direct intersubjective
exchange, the ultimate aim of consciousness science is not to
identify the minimally sufficient neural correlates of conscious-
ness, but rather to identify the (whole) neural basis, mechanism,
substrate, or constitution of consciousness.
C2: The current foundational construct of consciousness—the
minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness—can pick
out a different neural activity set to that picked out by the neural
basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of consciousness.
C3: If by “under conditions C” in Chalmers’ (2000) definition
of the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness, we
mean stepwise inhibition—the most obvious empirical approach
to distinguishing the merely sufficient from the minimally suffi-
cient neural correlates of consciousness—then the minimally suf-
ficient neural correlates of consciousness construct is limited by its
inclusion of neural activities that are not in fact part of the neural
basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of consciousness,
and by its exclusion of neural activities that are. Consciousness
science can nonetheless continue to work toward identifying
the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness using
recording strategies and the stepwise inhibition strategy.
C4: If by “under conditions C” in the definition of the
minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness we mean
isolated stimulation, then the minimally sufficient neural corre-
lates of consciousness construct is equivalent to the minimally
sufficient neural constitution of consciousness construct and at
least some constitutive neural activities will (arguably) be identi-
fiable. Whichever term is preferred, this neural activity set can be
different to that of the whole neural basis, mechanism, substrate,
or constitution of consciousness and hence neither construct
with the minimally sufficient qualifier should be considered the
ultimate target of consciousness science.
C5: Because of the possibilities of redundancy in the neural
constitution of consciousness (i.e., of constitutive non-minimally
sufficient neural correlates of consciousness) and of non-radical
neural multiple realizability, there is not yet evident an empirical
strategy to identify the whole neural constitution of conscious-
ness. Empirical approaches to this problem need to be developed,
and may require entirely new scientific strategies25.
25An abbreviated, conjoined and simpler set of claims, without specific
reference to empirical strategies and to P1–P3, would be:
C1: The ultimate aim of consciousness science is not to identify the minimally
sufficient neural correlates of consciousness, but rather to identify the (whole)
neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or constitution of consciousness.
C2: The current foundational construct of consciousness—the minimally
sufficient neural correlates of consciousness—can pick out a different neural
activity set to that picked out by the neural basis, mechanism, substrate, or
constitution of consciousness. Consciousness science can nonetheless con-
tinue to work toward identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of
consciousness.
C3: Although there may be empirical strategies to identify some constitutive
neural activity, there is not yet evident a strategy to identify the whole neural
The science of consciousness is young and thriving. There is a
great deal of empirical and conceptual work to be done in this field
and the foundational map charted by Chalmers (2000) needs to
be reassessed and built upon, with a focus on empirical strategies.
The analyses and new foundational claims presented here (and in
Miller, in press-b) are an attempt in this direction. Consciousness
remains, as ever, an intriguing subject of intellectual discourse. It
is today also rightly situated at the frontier of scientific endeavor.
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